Snohomish County, Decision 9607 (PECB, 2007)
STATE OF WASHINGTON
BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
SNOHOMISH COUNTY, )
)
Complainant, ) CASE 20177-U-06-5145
)
vs. ) DECISION 9607 - PECB
)
SNOHOMISH COUNTY CORRECTIONS )
GUILD, ) FINDINGS OF FACT,
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
Respondent. ) AND ORDER
)
___________________________________)
Janice E. Ellis, Prosecuting Attorney by Douglas J. Morrill and
Steven J. Bladek, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, for the employer.
Cline and Associates, by James Cline, for the union.
On February 14, 2006, Snohomish County (employer) filed charges of
unfair labor practices against the Snohomish County Corrections
Guild (union). The union represents approximately 210 custody and
corrections officers employed by the employer. The employer charged
that in recent negotiations to establish the first collective
bargaining agreement between these two parties, through a series of
actions, including proposing retroactive pay, the union refused to
bargain in good faith. The charge was found to state a cause of
action on March 30, 2006. A hearing before the undersigned Examiner
was held on October 9, 10, and 19, 2006. The parties filed
post-hearing briefs to complete the record.
ISSUES
1. Is a proposal for a retroactive wage increase on a first
collective bargaining agreement between parties an illegal
subject of bargaining?
2. By advancing an illegal subject of bargaining in its
negotiations with the employer did the union violate the statute?
3. Did the union refuse to bargain in good faith: by not exploring
areas of possible agreement with the employer; by failing to
meet for reasonable durations; by failing to prepare for
negotiating meetings; by advancing inconsistent positions; and
by engaging in deceptive tactics designed to foil agreement in
a contract ratification vote?
The Examiner finds that a proposal for retroactive pay for a first
collective bargaining agreement between parties is an illegal
subject of bargaining. Further, the Examiner finds that the union
did not bargain in good faith when it insisted through many months
of negotiations on putting forward proposals for retroactive pay.
The Examiner finds however, that the union did otherwise bargain in
good faith in its course of conduct during the bargaining. The
union is therefore found to have violated the statute in one part of
the complaint while the remainder of the complaint is dismissed.
PRECEDENT AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Subjects of Bargaining -
The Commission has long followed the federal precedent set by the
United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wooster Division of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In that case the court
distinguished between mandatory subjects of bargaining (employee
wages, hours and working conditions) and permissive subjects
(primarily management and union rights which are not improper
subjects) on which parties may bargain but are not obligated to do
so.
Washington law has been interpreted by our courts along the same
lines; including the "mandatory/permissive/illegal" triad of
bargaining subjects. This culminated in International Association
of Fire Fighters, Local 1052 v. Public Employment Relations
Commission (City of Richland), 113 Wn.2d 197 (1989) in which our
State Supreme Court held that a balancing approach is to be used
when determining the scope of the duty to bargain. Further
Commission decisions have defined "mandatory" and "permissive" and
in Snohomish County, Decision 8733-C (PECB, 2006), the Commission
defined illegal subjects of bargaining:
Matters that parties may not agree upon because of statutory or
constitutional prohibitions are illegal subjects of bargaining.
Neither party has an obligation to bargain such matters. City
of Anacortes, Decision 6380 (PECB, 1999).
Retroactive Pay -
The Washington State Supreme Court in Christie v. Port of Olympia,
27 Wn. 2d 534 (1947) set up the basis for the continuing rule that
has been followed by this Commission concerning retroactive pay. In
Christie the Court held that a public employer that pays additional
compensation for work already performed (and already paid for at
previous wage levels), is in violation of the state constitution
which specifically forbids gifts of public funds:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall
hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or
credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and
infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock
in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.
Washington State Constitution, Article 8, Section 7. In Christie
however, the court found that the union and the employer had
fashioned an agreement that employees would continue to work and
could be paid at a future wage rate yet to be determined. This is
the origin of the so-called "Christie Agreement" by which
retroactive wages could be negotiated so as not to become a gift of
public funds. The Court held that with such an agreement, the work
being compensated for was work being done after an agreement was
reached and therefore was not payment for work already performed.
In 1971 the state legislature codified the concept of retroactive
pay in successor collective bargaining agreements, in RCW 41.56.950:
Whenever a collective bargaining agreement between a public
employer and a bargaining representative is concluded after the
termination date of the previous collective bargaining
agreement between the same parties, the effective date of such
collective bargaining agreement may be the day after the
termination date of the previous collective bargaining
agreement and all benefits included in the new collective
bargaining agreement including wage increases may accrue
beginning with such effective date as established by this section.
(emphasis added).
Thus, as between the same parties, the legislature has given parties
negotiating successor agreements the right to negotiate retroactive
pay.
The only Commission case which interprets the Christie precedent in
detail is King County, Decision 4236 (PECB, 1992). In that case a
newly organized bargaining unit of police captains had bargained to
impasse on the issue of a retroactive wage increase. The examiner
held: "Without such a prior contract (i.e. a Christie agreement) to
use as a starting point, the employer could not legally offer
retroactivity for the captains."
Additionally, discussion in City of Burlington, Decision 5840,
(PECB, 1997) by another examiner is helpful.
Commission precedent differentiates permissive subjects from
illegal subjects. Permissive subjects may be proposed in
negotiations but must not be insisted upon to impasse. City of
Pasco, Decision 3582-A (PECB, 1991), while an illegal subject
may not be proposed or discussed at all. King County Fire
District 11, Decision 4538(PECB, 1994), dicta at page 11. Thus,
if the union's proposal is permissive I must determine whether
the union insisted on it to impasse, but if it is illegal that
decision need not be made.
And:
The only decision I have found that declares a proposal illegal
is King County, Decision 4236 (PECB, 1992), where the union
insisted to impasse on a retroactive pay increase for positions
that had just been added to the existing bargaining unit. Under
the circumstances, that proposal violated the state
constitution and therefore was an illegal subject.(fn:1)
____________________
fn:1 Also see: International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 27
v. City of Seattle, 93 Wn. App. 235 (1998 Div. I), review denied,
137 Wn.2d 1035 (1999)(IAFF v. Seattle) which found that a proposal
for supplemental pension benefits to be in conflict with the law
Enforcement Officers and Fire Fighters pension plan (LWOFF) and
therefore an illegal subject of bargaining.
ISSUE 1 - RETROACTIVE PAY DISCUSSION
The time frame of the parties' negotiations in the instant case is
helpful in following this analysis.
12/10/04 - the Teamsters Local 763 is decertified and the Snohomish
County Corrections Guild is certified as the bargaining
representative of the Snohomish County custody and corrections
officers.
3/22/05 - the first negotiation meeting between the parties. The
union proposed that the parties sign a Christie Agreement, but
the employer declined.
4/22/05 - the first union proposal includes an 8% increase
retroactive to 1/1/2005.
7/21/05 - after eleven meetings, the union files a mediation request
with the Commission maintaining its position for retroactive pay.
9/12/05 - after disagreement between parties as to when they would
meet, at the parties first meeting with a mediator, the union
maintains its position for retroactive pay back to 1/1/05.
1/1/06 - the union maintains its proposal for retroactive pay back
to 1/1/05, but changes percentages and implementation dates.
2/13/06 - the employer's full proposal, requested by the union as a
"final and last" proposal, is voted down by bargaining unit.
2/14/06 - the employer files charges of unfair labor practices.
5/11/06 - the union takes its "retroactive" request off of the
bargaining table and substitutes a "retention bonus" equal to
the amount of its original retroactive pay proposal.
10/12/06 - after 12 meetings in mediation, the parties are certified
for interest arbitration on 81 issues.
Thus the union maintained its proposal for retroactive pay
throughout most of its negotiations with the employer and all of the
negotiations prior to the filing of the instant charge of unfair
labor practices. On these facts, the employer's charge is well
founded. The union defends its continuing proposal on retroactivity
on several counts:
Commission Jurisdiction -
The union asserts that the Commission does not have the authority to
declare subjects as illegal when such a decision is based on other
state laws. It also argues that constitutional questions are for
the courts to decide and not within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
However, in deciding that a proposal for retroactive pay on a first
contract is an illegal subject of bargaining, this Examiner is
interpreting RCW 41.56.950 and following the Christie decision of
the State Supreme Court; the court whose mandate it is to interpret
the State Constitution. By following Christie and RCW 41.56 this
decision falls clearly within the jurisdiction of the Commission and
the union's defense fails.
Retroactive Pay Is Not Illegal -
The union argues that Christie does not make the affirmative
assertion that retroactive pay is an illegal subject of bargaining.
That argument is correct. However, by requiring an agreement
between parties to negotiate future wages for future work, Christie
places an obligation on the parties to reach agreement for future
wage increases and does not allow parties, absent a specific
agreement, to negotiate increases on wages already paid. In this
case, the union requested a "Christie agreement" at the first
negotiation meeting between the parties. The employer refused.
Therefore, in the continuing negotiations following that discussion,
both parties were well aware that there was no Christie agreement.
The union's continued insistence on retroactive pay in proposal
after proposal constitutes an unfair labor practice.
In another version of this argument, the union, while agreeing that
Christie has never been overruled, asserts that the State Supreme
Court's decision in City of Marysville v. DRS, 101 Wn2d 50 (1984)
raises questions about the continued viability of Christie.
However, in Marysville the court interpreted RCW 41.40.160(2) as
allowing prior service credit for purposes of future employee
pension benefits. It stated:
Then the pensions provided for under the act constitute
deferred compensation for the SUBSEQUENT service and are not
gratuities predicated merely upon the prior service.
In fact, this Examiner reads Marysville as being directly in concert
with the concepts discussed in Christie, and not modifying or
altering the earlier decision in the least. The union's proposal
for retroactive pay is, in the language of Marysville, a "gratuity
predicated merely upon prior service" which neither Christie nor
Marysville would allow.
The union also cites a Cowlitz County interest arbitration award by
Arbitrator Michael Beck and his discussion concerning retroactive
pay. As discussed in King County, Decision 4236 however:
[T]he Examiner is not bound by arbitration awards when faced
with statutory interpretation. The constitutional and
statutory limitations on retroactivity are not diminished by
the arbitrator's award, and the Examiner cannot "defer" to it
as an interpretation of the law.
Furthermore, as acknowledged by the union, Beck was discussing a
successor collective bargaining agreement; a fact not consistent
with the facts in the present case. Here the union is negotiating
the first contract for this bargaining unit with the Snohomish
County Corrections Guild as its certified bargaining representative.
Successor Agreement -
The union argues that it had agreed to be bound by some of the
language contained in the prior Teamsters collective bargaining
agreement and therefore its bargain was of the type that would
permit retroactive pay. This argument ignores the plain language of
RCW 41.56.950 which refers to " . . . the previous collective
bargaining agreement between the same parties, . . . " The previous
collective bargaining agreement was negotiated by Teamsters Union,
Local 763, clearly a different party then the Snohomish County
Corrections Guild that is the respondent in the instant case.
Whatever is the basis for the language upon which the employer and
this union have agreed, they are clearly not the same parties that
had bargained the previous agreement.
Similarly, the union argues that a labor organization acquiring
representation in a "raid" of another bargaining agent is a
successor for purposes of RCW 41.56.950. Again, the language refers
to the same parties not a successor party. This union is not the
same party that negotiated the predecessor agreement.
Conclusion -
The union's proposal for retroactive pay for their first collective
bargaining agreement with this employer was an illegal subject of
bargaining. By making such a proposal, the union has committed an
unfair labor practice.
ISSUE 2 - CONTINUING PROPOSAL FOR ILLEGAL SUBJECT OF BARGAINING
The union defends its proposals for retroactive pay by arguing that
it has never "refused to bargain" the issue. It contends that it
never refused to withdraw its proposal and that it did not bargain
retroactivity to impasse. This defense seems to be based on a
concept of "magic words." That is, that the parties should be
required to recite specific phrases or words in their bargaining in
order to be deemed to have violated or not violated 41.56 RCW. This
concept is rejected. In the first place the correct statutory
phrase is " . . . negotiate in good faith" from RCW 41.56.030(4).
This issue will not rise or fall on whether a party makes a formal
request that a proposal be withdrawn, but rather the focus is on
what the parties actually do in the course of their bargaining -
whether or not they act in good faith and not whether they just go
through the motions of bargaining.
During their 17 months of negotiations the union maintained its
proposal for retroactive pay. Never once during that time period
did the employer agree to the concept or include retroactive pay in
one of its proposals or counter-proposals. The union argues that it
had not "insisted" on the proposal and had "not refused" to withdraw
it. The Examiner is hard pressed to understand how continuing to
propose retroactive pay over many, many months of negotiations is
not "insistent" behavior and is not evidence of refusing to withdraw
their proposal. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the
employer somehow acquiesced in the union's continuing to press an
illegal subject of bargaining.
Another element that the union fails to take into account in its
defense of its retroactive pay proposal is the continuing impact of
such a proposal. Throughout their negotiations the employer is
faced with a proposal which increases in cost as the negotiations
proceed. Such a dynamic cost impact will logically be reflected in
the employer's ability or willingness to fund other union proposals.
The fact that the union held on to its illegal proposal cannot be
discounted and is a refusal to bargain in good faith.
Not Certified As An Issue For Interest Arbitration -
In King County the retroactive pay proposal that was judged to be
illegal had been included in a list of issues certified for interest
arbitration. Following that reasoning, this union asserts that it
had modified its retroactive pay proposal on May 4, 2006, prior to
impasse, and therefore avoided a violation of the law. However, its
modified proposal was:
Employee shall be paid retention bonuses with the first payroll
following execution of this agreement. . . . The formula for
the bonus shall be calculated to equal the amount of money that
would have been received by the employees for wage and wage
related increases and health insurance contributions had the
terms of this agreement been in effect from January 1, 2005 to
the date of execution. The Guild reserves the right to modify
this proposal to one of full retroactivity should a court of
competent jurisdiction declare that full retroactivity is lawful.
This proposal is full retroactivity under the name of "retention
bonus." Not only does it back any potential wage agreement to
January 1, 2005, but it also includes health insurance
contributions. In this Examiner's view the union never took its
proposal for retroactive pay off of the bargaining table and by not
doing so, committed an unfair labor practice. Finally, the
"retention bonus" proposal was made after the filing of this unfair
labor practice charge and post-filing action by the union is
irrelevant.
Conclusion -
By continuing to propose an illegal subject of bargaining throughout
the course of its negotiations with the employer, the union has
committed an unfair labor practice.
ISSUE 3 - OTHER EXAMPLES OF FAILURE TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
The employer has charged that in a variety of ways, the union
refused to bargain in good faith and actively sought to stifle
negotiations and to move issues to interest arbitration. In and of
itself, this goal is not unlawful. RCW 41.56.430-905 specifically
provides interest arbitration as a method of resolving contractual
issues between employers and uniformed employees. The employer
complains that employees on the bargaining team expressed a
preference for resolving the contract through interest arbitration,
but while that makes bargaining more difficult, it does not mean
that they are necessarily bargaining without good faith. On the
other side of the coin, the same statute at RCW 41.56.030(4) requires:
"Collective bargaining" means the performance of the mutual
obligations of the public employer and the exclusive bargaining
representative to meet at reasonable times, to confer and
negotiate in good faith, and to execute a written agreement
with respect to grievance procedures and collective
negotiations on personnel matters, including wages, hours and
working conditions, which may be peculiar to an appropriate
bargaining unit of such public employer, except that by such
obligation neither party shall be compelled to agree to a
proposal or be required to make a concession unless otherwise
provided in this chapter.
Thus the parties to uniformed negotiations must reconcile these two
statutory mandates. The employer charges that the union has failed
in this endeavor and lists specific examples.
Refusing to Meet at Reasonable Times or for Reasonable Durations -
The parties spent some time at the beginning of their negotiations
discussing what time of day that they would meet. From the evidence
presented it was clear that the union wanted to meet during the day
in part, at least, so that those members on the day shift would be
paid release time while negotiating. The employer initially
resisted this release time proposal, but eventually agreed to an
8:00 AM to 4:00 PM schedule with release time paid. Although the
employer asserts that by refusing to meet later than 4:00 PM, the
union was frustrating bargaining, the evidence does not support a
conclusion that meeting later in the day would have produced a
settlement. The employer was certainly within its rights when it
balked at paying its employees to negotiate, but this dispute took
place at least in part as early as April of 2005, which places it
outside of the six month time frame required by RCW 41.56.160.
Therefore, in and of it self, this allegation cannot support a
charge of unfair labor practices.
Refusing to Prepare for Negotiation Meetings -
The employer charged that the union would caucus during scheduled
negotiation meetings and it considered this to be a practice that
frustrated negotiations. On this issue however, the employer's
bargaining team has an advantage over the union's bargaining team.
Employer officials can prepare for bargaining during the normal
course of their workday. Such work is logically a part of their
work assignment and quite appropriately done during their regular
work hours. For the union members of the negotiating team however,
it would not be appropriate to prepare proposals, discuss priorities
or coordinate bargaining during duty time. They are expected to do
county work when they are at their duty station. Therefore it is
not unreasonable to expect that some time during regularly scheduled
negotiations must be spent by the union team to work on bargaining
issues. In fact, both sides might be expected to use negotiating
time to work on issues. The employer's example does not support a
charge of refusing to bargain in good faith.
Advancing Inconsistent Positions and Not Designating Spokesperson -
The employer particularly cites the discussions between the parties
concerning mandatory overtime in which it argued that the union
voiced different and sometimes conflicting opinions from various
members of the union's negotiating team. It asserts that this
practice made " . . . the entire process of negotiations convoluted
and unmanageable." The underlying premise of the employer's
argument seems to be that there is only one correct way to negotiate
a collective bargaining agreement or to present concerns on an
issue. The Examiner is not aware of any case in any jurisdiction
that has so stated. The union's practice may have been different
from past negotiations for this bargaining unit or different from
the practices of other unions with which the employer negotiates,
but that does not mean that it rises to the level of an unfair labor
practice. Furthermore, even if the table discussion were confusing,
the record at hearing clearly showed that the parties regularly
traded written proposals which should have served to establish
definitive union positions. Without evidence that the union was
somehow deliberately sabotaging the process, this evidence does not
rise to an unfair labor practice.
Engaging in Deceptive Tactics Designed to Foil Agreement -
The major element in this allegation involves the employer's
interpretation of the representations it believes were made by the
union to its membership when it voted the employer's proposal on
February 10, 2006. Prior to that date, the union had asked the
employer for its "last and final" offer and asked for it in bill
draft form. The employer complied with the latter, but insisted
that the offer it was presenting was not necessarily their final
offer.
In addition, the union presented a summary of this last employer
offer which the employer characterizes as "grossly inaccurate." It
particularly notes that the union provided such limited context that
it made some "relatively innocuous" proposals look to be "something
invidious" and that some issues were completely misrepresented. The
employer bases its concerns on a document that was circulated within
the Snohomish County jail; multiple copies of which were left in the
employee's lunch room where they were picked up and delivered to the
employer. The employer was appropriately not able to present
testimony as to the context in which this document was presented as
it was presented at a union ratification vote. But without more
precise evidence it is impossible to know whether the innocuous
proposals were actually viewed as invidious or if they were even a
subject of conversation. What actually convinced the bargaining
unit members to vote down the contract proposal is therefore
conjecture and is not sufficient basis for the finding of an unfair
labor practice. It must also be noted that the union summary of the
employer's proposals was not labeled as a last or best or final offer.
In the final analysis, the employer argues that the union betrayed
the principles of good faith bargaining in order to move the
negotiations to interest arbitration and out of the "give and take"
of bargaining. However, because interest arbitration is a
legislatively mandated mechanism for resolving issues in collective
bargaining for this bargaining unit, the standard to prove a breach
of good faith must be high: deliberate misrepresentation of crucial
issues to the bargaining unit membership; deliberate
misrepresentations to the employer at the bargaining table;
concerted effort to evade resolution of issues or refusal to provide
real explanations of positions. The employer's evidence and
argument does not support such an analysis and an unfair labor
practice on the basis of the complained-of behaviors or discussions
by the union's negotiating team cannot be found.
FINDING OF FACT
1. Snohomish County is a "public employer" within the meaning of
RCW 41.56.030(1). The employer operates a county jail and
staffs it, it part, with custody and corrections officers.
2. The Snohomish County Corrections Officers Guild is a
"bargaining representative" within the meaning of RCW
41.56.030(3), and was certified as the exclusive bargaining
representative of an appropriate bargaining unit of corrections
and custody officers on December 10, 2004.
3. On March 22, 2005, the employer and the union begin negotiation
of the first collective bargaining agreement between these
parties. At this meeting the union proposed that the parties
sign a "Christie agreement," but the employer declined.
4. On April 22, 2005, the union makes its first economic proposal
and proposes retroactive pay back to January 1, 2005, and asks
that the employer sign a "Christie agreement." The employer
refused both proposals.
5. After eleven meetings the union files a request for mediation
on July 21, 2005.
6. After the employer provided a complete counter-proposal on all
issues in dispute, the bargaining unit voted down the proposal
on February 13, 2006. On February 14, 2006, the employer filed
the instant charges of unfair labor practices. No further
meetings occurred between the parties.
7. On May 11, 2006, the union substituted a "retention bonus"
proposal for its retroactive pay proposal that it had
maintained to this date.
8. On November 12, 2006, the parties are certified for interest
arbitration on 81 issues.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in
this matter under Chapter 41.56 RCW and Chapter 391-45 WAC.
2. At their second negotiation meeting and in their first economic
proposal, the union proposed that the pay increase be
retroactive to January 1, 2005. Such a proposal is an illegal
subject of bargaining and in violation of RCW 42.56.150(4).
3. By maintaining its proposal for retroactive pay or the
equivalent thereof throughout negotiations and into mediation,
the union has failed to bargain in good faith and has committed
an unfair labor practice in violation of RCW 31.45.150(4).
4. Union positions or practices during bargaining such as
proposing meetings during specific hours, caucusing during
scheduled meetings, allowing various members of the negotiating
team to present positions during bargaining, and preparing a
synopsis of the employer's last offer which was inaccurate in
some of its details, are within the parameters of bargaining in
good faith and are not, individually or collectively, an unfair
labor practice as defined by RCW 41.56.150(4).
ORDER
That part of the employer's complaint filed in the above-captioned
matter concerning practices and behaviors during bargaining is
DISMISSED.
AND
That part of the employer's complaint filed in the above-captioned
matter concerning the union's initial and continuing proposals on
retroactive pay states a violation of 41.56 RCW.
Therefore the SNOHOMISH COUNTY CORRECTIONS GUILD, its officers and
agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its
unfair labor practices:
1. CEASE AND DESIST from:
Refusing to bargain in good faith by maintaining any
proposals in negotiations or interest arbitration which
constitute retroactive pay for hours of work that have
already been worked by custody and corrections employees
in its bargaining unit in Snohomish County.
2. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the
purposes and policies of Chapter 41.56 RCW:
a. Remove any proposals for retroactive pay for hours of work
that have been already been worked by the custody and
corrections employees in its bargaining unit in Snohomish
County, including any such proposals which may have been
certified for interest arbitration.
b. Post copies of the notice attached to this order in
conspicuous places on the employer's premises where
notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted.
These notices shall be duly signed by an authorized
representative of the respondent, and shall remain posted
for 60 consecutive days from the date of initial posting.
The respondent shall take reasonable steps to ensure that
such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered
by other material.
c. Notify the complainant, in writing, within 20 days
following the date of this order, as to what steps have
been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time
provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice
attached to this order.
d. Notify the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment
Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days following
the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken
to comply with this order, and at the same time provide
the Compliance Officer with a signed copy of the notice
attached to this order.
ISSUED at Olympia, Washington, this 9th day of March, 2007.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
WALTER M. STUTEVILLE, Examiner
This order will be the final order of the
agency unless a notice of appeal is filed
with the Commission under WAC 391-45-350.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
NOTICE
THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION CONDUCTED A LEGAL
PROCEEDING IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND
ARGUMENT. THE COMMISSION RULED THAT WE COMMITTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN
VIOLATION OF STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS, AND ORDERED US TO POST THIS
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES:
WE UNLAWFULLY initially proposed and thereafter continued to propose an
illegal subject of bargaining, retroactive pay, during the bargaining for an
initial collective bargaining agreement with Snohomish County.
TO REMEDY OUR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES:
WE WILL remove any references to any form of retroactive pay or pay for work
which has already been done from any future proposals for the first
collective bargaining agreement between Snohomish County and the Snohomish
County Corrections Guild, or any such references from any lists of issues
submitted to the Public Employment Relations Commission for certification
for interest arbitration.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, refuse to bargain in good faith under the
laws of the State of Washington.
DATED: _________________ SNOHOMISH COUNTY CORRECTIONS GUILD
BY: ______________________________
Authorized Representative
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days, and must not be
altered or covered by any other material. Questions about this notice or
compliance with the Commission's order may be directed to the Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC), 112 Henry Street NE, Suite 300, PO
Box 40919, Olympia, Washington 98504-0919. Telephone: (360) 570-7300.
The full decision will be published on PERC's web site, www.perc.wa.gov.