Seattle School District, Decision 9628-A (PECB, 2008)
STATE OF WASHINGTON
BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING )
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 609, )
)
Complainant, ) CASE 20309-U-06-5173
)
vs. ) DECISION 9628-A - PECB
)
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Respondent. ) DECISION OF COMMISSION
)
___________________________________)
Schwerin Campbell Barnard, by Kathleen Phair Barnard, Attorney
at Law, for the union.
John M. Cerqui, Senior Assistant General Counsel, for the
employer.
This case comes before the Commission on a timely appeal filed by
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 609 (union),
seeking to overturn certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
issued by Examiner Frederick J. Rosenberry dismissing the union's
complaint.(fn:1) The Seattle School District (employer) supports the
Examiner's decision.
____________________
fn:1 Seattle School District, Decision 9628 (PECB, 2007).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the Examiner correctly dismiss the union's claim of
unlawful discrimination against employee Deborah Youderian?
2. Did the Examiner correctly dismiss the union's claim of
unlawful interference with Youderian's union activity?
3. Did the Examiner correctly dismiss the union's claim that the
employer failed and refused to provide information that was
necessary and relevant to collective bargaining?
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Examiner's decision
dismissing the claims of discrimination under RCW 41.56.140(1) and
interference under RCW 41.56.140(1). With regard to the allegation
that the employer failed and refused to provide information under
RCW 41.56.140(4), we reverse the Examiner's decision. When an
employer is faced with an information request from its employees'
collective bargaining representative, the employer has an obligation
to provide the requested information or notify the union if it does
not believe the information is relevant to collective bargaining
activities. In the case at hand, the union requested information
that was relevant to collective bargaining and contract
administration. The employer should have responded by providing the
union with the information it requested. The employer violated RCW
41.56.140(4) by failing to provide the union with a copy of the
document it requested and informing the union in writing that the
document did not exist when it did in fact exist.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Commission does not conduct a de novo review of examiner
decisions in unfair labor practice proceedings under Chapter 391-45
WAC. Rather, we review findings of fact to determine whether they
are supported by substantial evidence and, if so, whether those
findings of fact support the conclusions of law and the order.
Cowlitz County, Decision 7007-A (PECB, 2000). Substantial evidence
exists if the record contains competent, relevant, and substantive
evidence which, if accepted as true, would, within the bounds of
reason, directly or circumstantially support the challenged finding
or findings. Ballinger v. Department of Social and Health Services,
104 Wn.2d 323 (1985). The Commission attaches considerable weight to
the factual findings and inferences made by its examiners. City of
Edmonds, Decision 8798-A (PECB, 2005). Additionally, the Examiner
generally is best situated to make credibility determinations
because he or she had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses. Although this Commission is not bound by the Examiner's
credibility determination, we will generally defer to it. City of
Seattle, Decision 3066-A (PECB, 1989). This deference is even more
appropriate in fact-oriented appeals. Cowlitz County, Decision 7007-A.
ISSUE 1 - DISCRIMINATION
Applicable Legal Standard
A discrimination violation occurs when an employer takes action
which is substantially motivated as a reprisal against the exercise
of rights protected by Chapter 41.56 RCW. See Educational Service
District 114, Decision 4361-A (PECB, 1994), where the Commission
embraced the standard established by the Supreme Court of the State
of Washington in Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum, 118 Wn.2d 46 (1991), and
Allison v. Seattle Housing Authority, 118 Wn.2d 79 (1991). A
discrimination violation can be found when:
1. An employee exercises a right protected by the collective
bargaining statute, or communicates to the employer an intent
to do so.
2. The employee was deprived of some ascertainable right, status
or benefit.
3. A causal connection exists between the protected union activity
and the action claimed to be discriminatory.
Where a complainant establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer need only articulate non-discriminatory
reasons for its actions. The employer does not have the burden of
proof to establish those matters. Port of Tacoma, Decision 4626-A
(PECB, 1995). The burden remains on the complainant to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the disputed action was in
retaliation for the employee's exercise of statutory rights. That
may be done by showing that the reasons given by the employer were
pretextual, or by showing that union animus was nevertheless a
substantial motivating factor behind the employer's actions. Port
of Tacoma, Decision 4626-A.
Application of Standard
The union asserts that the employer unlawfully retaliated against
employee Deborah Youderian (Youderian) for involving her union in a
dispute over the use of the kitchen facilities at the Madrona K-8
School (the school). Specifically, the union alleges that the
employer retaliated against Youderian by reducing the number of
people assigned to help her serve lunch to students. The facts
surrounding the use of the school kitchen and assignment of help in
the lunch room can be broken down as follows.
Youderian was the lunch room manager at the school during the
2005-2006 school year. She was assisted by Alberta Battles
(Battles), a lunch room assistant. Youderian and Battles were both
employed by the district's Child Nutrition Services Department and
reported directly to a supervisor in that department. Youderian and
Battles did not have a direct reporting relationship to the school
principals. From September 1, 2005 through October 31, 2005,
Carolyn Manning (Manning) was employed by the school as a
playground/lunch supervisor and routinely helped Youderian and
Battles serve lunch to students.
On October 31, 2005, Manning started working for the school as a
Peak Load Clerical Temporary, a limited duration position that was
scheduled to last 90 days. Manning was primarily assigned to perform
clerical work in the school's office. Upon starting her new
position, Manning gave up her playground/lunch supervisor position.
Manning was not directed by her supervisors to continue helping in
the lunch room, but she continued to help serve lunch to students
because she felt her help was needed. Sometimes Manning would even
come into the school on her days off and serve lunch as an unpaid
volunteer.
In addition to paid staff, students who had a teacher's assistant
class period sometimes helped in the school's lunch room. During
the second academic quarter (November 14, 2005 through February 2,
2006), four students were assigned to help in the lunch room.
The first day of the new academic quarter was February 6, 2006. On
the evening of February 7, the school hosted a math competition.
Food for the event was provided by a private catering company. At
the conclusion of the event, school staff members, who were not
employed by the Child Nutrition Services Department, transferred
leftover food from the caterer's pans to pans owned by the school.
They stored the leftover food in the walk-in cooler in the school
kitchen. No Child Nutrition Services employees were present.
The employer's Child Nutrition Services Employee Handbook, a
document that was negotiated by the employer and union, contains
policies on use of the school kitchen facilities. Specifically, the
handbook states that "All food prepared in a school kitchen must be
under the supervision of the Child Nutrition Services employees."
With regard to food brought in to be heated and light refreshments,
"The [kitchen] manager must approve the use of all equipment and
supplies in the kitchen . . . District dishes, trays and flatware
are not to be used."
On the morning of February 8, Youderian arrived at work and saw that
some items in the kitchen were out of place and pans belonging to
the school district were full of food from an unknown source.
Youderian called the Child Nutrition Services Department and
informed a supervisor that there were pans of food of unknown origin
in the school's walk-in cooler. Youderian asked the supervisor what
should be done about the food. The supervisor said she would get in
touch with Billie Curtiss (Curtiss), Youderian's direct supervisor,
and take care of it.
Shortly after Youderian called Child Nutrition Services, Principal
Kaaren Andrews (Andrews) and Assistant Principal Henterson Carlisle
(Carlisle) approached Youderian. Andrews informed Youderian that
she had received a message from Child Nutrition Services. A
conversation about the use of the kitchen facilities and pans of
leftover food ensued. Accounts of that conversation vary:
According to Youderian, Andrews was upset and asked Youderian why
she had called Child Nutrition Services rather than coming to
Andrews first. Youderian explained it was her job to keep the kids'
food safe and explained that she did not know where the food had
come from. Andrews then told Youderian she should not have called
Child Nutrition Services. Andrews explained that although the
school had been supportive of Youderian, it did not have to support
her. Andrews said she could stop assisting in the serving and call
Child Nutrition Services if Youderian was too slow. Andrews told
Youderian if she wanted to get along at the school she would never
call downtown (Child Nutrition Services) again.
According to Andrews, she asked Youderian why Child Nutrition
Services was calling. Youderian explained that she needed the pans
that had been used to store the leftover food in order to make
lunch. Youderian also explained that only people from Child
Nutrition Services could put food in the walk-in cooler. Youderian
told Andrews, "you are not my boss." Andrews acknowledged that she
was not Youderian's boss, and explained that she just wanted to talk
about and resolve the situation so lunch could be made. Andrews
denies making any statements that implied she could or would pull
kitchen help or report Youderian for being slow. Andrews also
denies telling Youderian never to call downtown again.
According to Carlisle, Andrews explained that there had been food
left over from an event the prior evening. She did not think the
school should waste the food so she and others decided to store it
in the school kitchen and used some pans from the kitchen. Andrews
told Youderian that she wished that Youderian would talk to Carlisle
and herself before calling Child Nutrition Services when she had a
problem. Youderian told Andrews, "I don't work for you. I don't
have to listen to you. . . You are not my boss." Andrews said the
staff needed to work together to solve problems. Carlisle did not
hear Andrews threaten to reduce the amount of help assigned to the
kitchen, to report Youderian for being slow, or tell Youderian that
if she wanted to get along at the school she would never call
downtown again.
After the above conversation took place, Curtiss, Youderian's direct
supervisor from Child Nutrition Services, arrived at the school to
assist with the clean up of the pans of food. At or about 10 or
10:30 a.m., Curtiss called the union about the situation.
Sometime during the lunch hour, David Westberg (Westberg), the union
business manager, came to the school to investigate the situation.
Westberg met with Andrews and discussed the use of the kitchen and
related allegations of a contract violation over loss of unit work.
Andrews agreed to pay Youderian for the hours of work that should
have been assigned to Child Nutrition Services staff with regards to
storing and cleaning up the food from the February 7 event. No
formal grievance was filed.
The next day, February 9, Youderian had a conversation with Manning
regarding help in the lunch room. According to Youderian, Manning
said she couldn't help serve lunch because Andrews did not want
Manning to help serve. However, Manning testified she was never
told by any of her supervisors to stop serving lunch to the students.
On February 9, Manning no longer helped serve lunch on a regular
basis and Youderian did not routinely have a third person to help
serve lunch starting. Youderian wanted help serving lunch but did
not ask any of the school principals for assistance.
On February 19, the union met with Andrews and informed her that it
expected the school to restore help in the lunch room. On March 9,
Andrews hired a second lunch room assistant and the new employee
started working at the school.
The question now before this Commission is whether or not the
employer discriminated against Youderian in retaliation for her
union activity by reducing the amount of serving assistance she
received during the lunch hour.
The Union's Prima Facie Case
The union met the first part of the discrimination test outlined
above by showing that Youderian exercised a collective bargaining
right when she met with union representative Westberg to discuss the
unauthorized use of the school kitchen. Westberg subsequently met
with the school principal to discuss concerns raised by Youderian,
putting the employer on notice of Youderian's union activity.
The union met the second part of the discrimination test by showing
that serving assistance in the lunch room benefitted Youderian
because it reduced the time pressures of serving lunch and allowed
her to accomplish this task more efficiently. The reduction in
serving assistance caused lunch to be served more slowly than it was
when there were three people serving, and placed a larger work load
on Youderian.
With regard to the third part of the discrimination test, the union
met its burden by showing that the timing of the reduction in
serving help during the lunch hour closely correlated with the
timing of the union's involvement in the kitchen use concerns raised
by Youderian. The union established a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination.
The Employer's Rebuttal
Having found that the union established a prima facie case, we now
need to evaluate the employer's non-discriminatory reasons for the
reduction of help in the lunch room.
With regard to the reduction in student teacher assistants (TAs),
the employer produced documents and testimony demonstrating that the
loss of the student help in the lunch room was the result of class
schedule changes that took place at the end of the academic quarter.
During the third academic quarter, which started on February 6,
2006, no TA class was offered during any of the lunch periods. As a
result no student TAs were available to assist with serving lunch.
This schedule was determined prior to the beginning of the school
year, before the employer became aware of Youderian's union
activity.
The record also contained several reasons for the reduction of
Manning's assistance. Starting on October 31, 2005, when Manning
accepted a 90-day Peak Load Clerical Temporary position, she no
longer had lunch room assistance as part of her job duties.
Testimony revealed that, starting in November 2005, Manning's
assistance in the lunch room was voluntary, unscheduled, and
sometimes uncompensated.
In February 2006, Manning helped less during the lunch hour in the
school's lunch room in order to focus on professional development
and care for her sick child. On February 15, Manning's temporary
position ended. Manning continued to occasionally come in and
volunteer in the lunch room, but not as often. Manning testified
that she was not directed to stop volunteering in the lunch room.
Union's Ultimate Burden of Proof
The Examiner found that the union did not rebut the employer's
non-discriminatory explanations for the change in assistance in the
lunch room. We agree, and we affirm the Examiner's decision
dismissing the union's complaint.
ISSUE 2 - INTERFERENCE
Applicable Legal Standard
Chapter 41.56 RCW prohibits employer interference with the exercise
of collective bargaining rights by employees. RCW 41.56.040.
Included in those rights are the rights of employees to engage in
union activity without threat of reprisal. RCW 41.56.140(1) enforces
those statutory rights by establishing that an employer who
interferes with, restrains, or coerces public employees in the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights commits an unfair
labor practice.
The burden of proving unlawful interference rests with the
complaining party. An interference violation exists when an
employee could reasonably perceive the employer's actions as a
threat of reprisal or force, or promise of benefit, associated with
the protected union activity of the employee or other employees.
Kennewick School District, Decision 5632-A (PECB, 1996). The
employee is not required to show an intention or motivation to
interfere on the part of the employer. City of Tacoma, Decision
6793-A (PECB, 2000). Nor is it necessary to show that the employee
was actually coerced or that the employer had a union animus for an
interference charge to prevail. City of Tacoma, Decision 6793-A.
Application of Legal Standard
In order to find an interference violation, the threat of reprisal
must be associated with union activity. At the time the
conversation between Youderian and Andrews occurred, Youderian had
not engaged in any union activity. Prior to the conversation,
Youderian called the Child Nutrition Services Department and spoke
with a supervisor. During that conversation Youderian asked for
advice as to how to handle the situation, but did not file a
grievance or otherwise express an intent to engage in union
activity. Specifically, the union did not establish that
Youderian's report regarding kitchen use and improper food storage
to a Child Nutrition Services supervisor was linked to the exercise
of collective bargaining rights. Youderian's union activity did not
occur until the union was first notified of the situation at
approximately 10 or 10:30 a.m.
Again, we affirm the Examiner's decision to dismiss the union's
complaint because the union failed to establish an interference
violation.
ISSUE 3 - DUTY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
Applicable Legal Standard
The Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, Chapter 41.56 RCW,
governs the relationship between these parties. Under RCW
41.56.030(4), the parties have an obligation to negotiate in good
faith. Under both federal and state law, this duty to bargain
includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by the
opposite party for the proper performance of its duties in the
collective bargaining process. National Labor Relations Board v.
Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); City of Bellevue, Decision
3085-A (PECB, 1989), aff'd, City of Bellevue v. International
Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1604, 119 Wn.2d 373 (1992). The
obligation extends not only to information that is useful and
relevant to the collective bargaining process, but also encompasses
information necessary to the administration of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. King County, Decision 6772-A
(PECB, 1999).
In King County, Decision 6772-A, this Commission embraced the
"discovery-type" standard used by the National Labor Relations Board
to determine relevancy of requested information. Under this
standard, as explained in Maben Energy Corp., 295 NLRB 149 (1989):
[A]n employer is obligated to provide a union with requested
information if there is a probability that such data is
relevant and will be of use to the union in fulfilling its
statutory duties and responsibilities as the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative. The issue in such a case
is 'whether the requested information had probable and
potential relevance to the union's statutory obligation to
represent employees within the contractual units'; '[T]he fact
the requested information may relate to employers and employees
outside the represented bargaining unit does not by itself
negate its relevance'; for, whatever the eventual merits of the
union's claim that their contracts are being violated and their
bargaining units unlawfully diminished, they are entitled to
the requested information under the discovery type standard
announced in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437
(1967), to judge for themselves whether to press their claims
in the contractual grievance procedure or before the Board or
Courts. Citing Associated General Contractors of California,
242 NLRB 891 (1979), enfd. as modified 633 F.2d 766 (9th Cir.
1980) and Electrical Energy Services, 288 NLRB 925 (1988)."
Parties must turn over relevant collective bargaining information
that is in their control. Failure to do so is an unfair labor
practice.
Application of Standard
It is undisputed that by letter dated February 14, the union
requested information and explained:
In our ongoing efforts to fully enforce the collective
bargaining agreement and to ensure equitable treatment to all
of our members, we sometimes need to investigate the actions of
administrators and other employees of the District. For these
purposes we will need access to the following information . . .
The information I need to receive, review and/or make
arrangements to copy are relating to an event that was held at
Madrona Elementary on the night of February 7, 2006.
The union's letter specifically requested a copy of "the check
written to any and all contractors involved."
The Examiner found that the union failed to establish that a copy of
the check written to the contractor was reasonably related to a
specific bargaining issue. We disagree with that conclusion.
In its appeal, the union argues that the Examiner's Finding of Fact
11, indicating that "Union official Westberg stated that a copy of
the check was needed to help determine why it costs more to educate
children in the Seattle School District than other districts," is
incomplete. We agree that this explanation omits important
reasoning. Westberg testified that the union wanted a copy of the
check so it could determine who paid for the catering of the
February 7 function. Westberg further explained that the
information on the check was relevant to enforcing a school district
policy that Child Nutrition Services employees be given first
opportunity to work special events, such as the one that occurred on
February 7. The written request submitted by the union stated that
the information was necessary to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement and to ensure equitable treatment of its members. If an
employer believes that information requested is not necessary or
relevant to administration of the collective bargaining agreement,
the employer has an obligation to put the union on notice of that
belief. At that point the burden shifts to the union to explain why
the information is necessary or relevant.
In the case at hand, the employer never questioned the union's
request for information. Approximately one month after receiving
the request, the employer responded with a letter and packet of
documents. With regard to the union's request for a copy of the
check used to pay the contractor, the employer wrote, "According to
Ms. Andrews, no check was written." The employee did not raise
concerns about the confidentiality of the information requested nor
did it question the relevance of the information to the
administration of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
In his analysis, the Examiner explained that the employer's failure
to provide the union with a copy of the check did not impact the
union because the information contained in the check had already
been provided to the union in a different form, making the provision
of the check unnecessary. We disagree with the Examiner's
conclusion. The union requested a specific document that was
relevant to its role as a collective bargaining representative. The
employer should have given the union a copy of the document and
allowed the document to speak for itself. Although the invoice from
the contractor contained information on the cost of the event, it
did not provide information on how the event was paid for.
Similarly, the employer's written explanation that the event was
funded by Meany's Algebra Project Ray of Hope Grant did not provide
the union with information on whether the catering for the event was
paid through a district account or directly by an outside
organization. As Westberg explained in his testimony, the source of
the money is relevant to contract administration because the food
service workers have contractual priority to work at events that are
funded though district accounts.
Lastly, the Examiner pointed out that the check requested by the
union was not essential to resolving the dispute over a violation of
kitchen protocol. This is not the proper test to apply to the
relevancy of the information. The union met its burden under the
discovery type standard to show that the check could potentially
contain information that was necessary and relevant to investigating
a reduction or loss of bargaining unit work. As a result it is
necessary for us to evaluate the employer's response to the request.
The employer does not dispute that it told the union no check was
written and it did not provide a copy of the check to the union. The
employer argues that an omission of one document should not be
considered a breach of good faith, particularly in the context of an
information request in which the union requested multiple documents
and all but one was provided. We disagree. We do not view this as
a case of accidental omission. Had the employer accidentally
omitted the document, the union could have sent a follow up request
to the employer and obtained the document. Here, the employer
stated the document did not exist, although, in actuality, it did.
Carelessly or knowingly providing false information in response to
an information request violates the duty to bargain in good faith.
For example, in Sony Corp., 313 NLRB 420 (1993), the NLRB considered
a situation in which an employer gave a union false and misleading
information in response to an information request. The NLRB upheld
the Administrative Law Judge's decision that "it is a violation of
the duty to bargain in good faith to give a false and misleading
answer in response to a union's information request." Sony Corp.,
313 NLRB 420, citing Assn. of D.C. Liquor Wholesalers, 300 NLRB 224
(1990). We agree that the duty to bargain in good faith includes a
duty to provide accurate information.
When responding to an information request, an employer has an
obligation to make a reasonable good faith effort to locate the
information requested. In this case a reasonable effort to locate
the information would include going to the employer's finance
department and finding out the status of the check. When Serena
Gregerson, an Human Resources Analyst for the employer, was asked
about the employer's response that "According to Ms. Andrews, no
check was written," she acknowledged that the employer's response
was "a little lazy." In sum, the evidence shows that the employer
did not make a reasonable good faith effort to locate the
information that was requested by the union.
In conclusion, we find the employer's response to the union's
information request was false and misleading and constituted a
violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. The employer
violated RCW 41.56.140(4) by failing and refusing to provide
accurate information to the union that was necessary and relevant to
collective bargaining. That portion of the Examiner's decision must
be reversed, and we amend the findings of fact and conclusions of
law accordingly.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission makes the following:
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
The Findings of Fact issued by Examiner Frederick J. Rosenberry are
adopted as the Commission's Findings of Fact, except paragraphs 11
and 12 which are amended as follows:
11. By letter dated February 14, 2006, the union requested
considerable information from the employer regarding the
February 7, 2006, academic contest banquet. The letter
specifically requested a copy of the check that was used to pay
the contractor. The stated reason for the request was to fully
administer the parties' collective bargaining agreement and
ensure equitable treatment for all of its members.
12. By letter dated March 16, 2006, the employer provided data in
response to the union's information request, including a report
that no check was issued. The union suspected that the
information from the employer was inaccurate and subsequently
contacted the State Auditor's Office. Approximately five to
six months after the February 7 event, the union obtained a
copy of the check from the State Auditor's Office.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Conclusions of Law issued by Examiner Frederick J. Rosenberry
are adopted as the Commission's Conclusions of Law except paragraph
3, which is amended to read:
3. By failing to provide information requested by the
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 609, and by
providing the union with false information as described in
Finding of Fact 12, the Seattle School District violated RCW
41.56.140(4) and (1).
AMENDED ORDER
Seattle School District, its officers and agents, shall immediately
take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:
1. CEASE AND DESIST from:
a. Failing to provide the International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 609, relevant requested collective
bargaining information in a timely manner; and
b. In any other manner interfering with, restraining or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights under by the laws of the State of
Washington.
2. TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the
purposes and policies of Chapter 41.56 RCW:
a. Upon request, make a reasonable effort to locate and
provide relevant collective bargaining information to the
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 609.
b. Post copies of the notice attached to this order in
conspicuous places on the employer's premises where
notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted.
These notices shall be duly signed by an authorized
representative of the respondent, and shall remain posted
for 60 consecutive days from the date of initial posting.
The respondent shall take reasonable steps to ensure that
such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered
by other material.
c. Read the notice attached to this order into the record at
a regular public meeting of the School Board of the
Seattle School District, and permanently append a copy of
the notice to the official minutes of the meeting where
the notice is read, as required by this paragraph.
d. Notify the complainant, in writing, within 20 days
following the date of this order, as to what steps have
been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time
provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice
attached to this order.
e. Notify the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment
Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days following
the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken
to comply with this order, and at the same time provide
the Compliance Officer with a signed copy of the notice
attached to this order.
Issued at Olympia, Washington, the 2nd day of January, 2008.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
MARILYN GLENN SAYAN, Chairperson
PAMELA G. BRADBURN, Commissioner
DOUGLAS G. MOONEY, Commissioner
Case 20309-U-06-5173
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
NOTICE
THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION CONDUCTED A LEGAL
PROCEEDING IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND
ARGUMENT. THE COMMISSION RULED THAT WE COMMITTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN
VIOLATION OF STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS, AND ORDERED US TO POST THIS
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES:
WE UNLAWFULLY failed to provide your union with information it requested
that was relevant to collective bargaining and told your union the
information did not exist, when in fact it did exist.
TO REMEDY OUR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES:
WE WILL make a reasonable good faith effort to locate and provide the
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 609, with relevant
collective bargaining information that it requests.
WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights under the
laws of the State of Washington.
DATED: _________________
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT
BY: ______________________________
Authorized Representative
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days, and must not be
altered or covered by any other material. Questions about this notice or
compliance with the Commission's order may be directed to the Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC), 112 Henry Street NE, Suite 300, PO
Box 40919, Olympia, Washington 98504-0919. Telephone: (360) 570-7300.
The full decision will be published on PERC's web site, www.perc.wa.gov.