STATE OF WASHINGTON
BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS COMMISSION
|
Complainant, vs. Respondent. |
CASE DECISION FINDINGS OF FACT, |
Frank Freed Subit & Thomas,
by Clifford Freed, for the union.
Davis Wright Tremaine, by Henry E. Farber and Kelsey M. Sheldon, for the employer.
On February 5, 2009, the Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 587 (union), filed an unfair labor practice complaint
against King County (employer). The
complaint alleges employer refusal to bargain and interference. The Commission appointed Jamie L. Siegel as
the Examiner, and I held a hearing on May 20 and 28, 2009. At hearing, the union withdrew its direct
dealing complaint. The parties filed
post-hearing briefs on July 31, 2009, and additional briefing in light of Griffin School District, Decision 10489
(PECB, 2009), on September 2, 2009.
ISSUES
1.
Was
the employer’s decision to furlough certain bargaining unit employees on ten
days in 2009 a mandatory subject of bargaining?
2.
If
the decision to furlough employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining, did
the employer establish a business necessity that excused it from its duty to
bargain the decision to furlough employees?
3.
Did
the employer satisfy its obligation under RCW 41.56.140(1) to bargain the
effects of its decision to furlough employees on ten days in 2009 when it
implemented its decision without reaching an agreement with the union on the
effects of the decision?
The employer refused to bargain and
interfered with employee rights when it decided to furlough certain bargaining
unit employees on ten scheduled work days without offering to bargain the
decision with the union. Applying the
balancing test, I conclude that the furlough decision was a mandatory subject
of bargaining. Although the employer was
faced with closing a significant budget deficit in a volatile economic
environment, the employer failed to establish a business necessity defense
excusing it from fulfilling its bargaining obligation. The employer also failed to fulfill its
obligation to bargain the effects of the furlough decision when it implemented
its decision without reaching an agreement with the union or pursuing the
impasse process outlined in RCW 41.56.492.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Bargaining Obligation – Mandatory and
Permissive Subjects of Bargaining
Chapter 41.56 RCW requires a public
employer to bargain with the exclusive bargaining representative of its
employees. The duty to bargain extends
to mandatory subjects of bargaining including wages, hours and working
conditions. RCW 41.56.030(4). The law limits the scope of mandatory
subjects to those matters of direct concern to employees. International
Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1052 v. PERC (City of Richland), 113 Wn.2d 197 (1989). Unless a union clearly waives its right to
bargain, an employer is prohibited from making unilateral changes to mandatory
subjects. An employer must give a union
sufficient notice of possible changes affecting mandatory subjects of
bargaining and, upon union request, bargain in good faith until reaching
agreement or impasse. In accordance with
RCW 41.56.492, when a transit employer and union are unable to agree concerning
changes to a mandatory subject, the employer may not unilaterally implement the
change; instead, the parties may proceed to mediation and, if still at impasse,
to interest arbitration. See City of Tukwila, Decision 9691-A
(PECB, 2008).
The Commission classifies managerial
decisions that only remotely affect terms and conditions of employment as
permissive subjects of bargaining. North Franklin School District, Decision
5945-A (PECB, 1998). Parties may bargain
regarding such subjects but are not required to do so. If an employer’s decision on a permissive
subject of bargaining materially impacts wages, hours, or working conditions of
bargaining unit employees, the employer must bargain with the union concerning
those impacts. Spokane County Fire District 9, Decision 3661-A (PECB, 1991).
The Commission’s decisions cannot
always draw bright lines between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining because the cases often present unique facts. In situations where a managerial decision
also involves wages, hours or working conditions, the Commission and its
examiners apply a balancing test to determine whether the matter is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The balancing
test analyzes which of the following two characteristics predominate: (1) the extent to which the managerial action
impacts the employees’ wages, hours or working conditions, or (2) the extent to
which the managerial action is an essential management prerogative. As the Washington State Supreme Court stated
in International Association of Fire
Fighters, Local 1052 v. PERC (City of
Richland), 113 Wn.2d 197 (1989):
“The critical consideration in determining whether an employer has a
duty to bargain is the nature of the impact on the bargaining unit versus the
employer’s need for managerial control.”
A party asserting an unfair labor
practice complaint bears the burden of proving its case. WAC 391-45-270(1)(a).
Business Necessity Defense
In very limited circumstances, the
Commission excuses an employer from fulfilling its full bargaining
obligation. An employer may implement a
unilateral change of employee wages, hours or working conditions without
satisfying its obligation to bargain the decision when necessitated by
compelling practical or legal circumstances.
City of Tukwila, Decision
9691-A. In making such decisions, the
Commission “examines all of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding
the particular event.” The employer
bears the burden of proving the defense.
WAC 391-45-270(1)(b); Cowlitz
County, Decision 7007-A (PECB, 2000). Even when an employer meets the
burden of establishing a business necessity defense, the employer must still
bargain the effects the decision has on mandatory subjects of bargaining.
An employer claiming such a defense
must prove that: (1) a business necessity existed; (2) it provided adequate
notice to the union of the proposed change; and (3) the parties bargained over
the effects of the change or the union waived bargaining. Skagit
County, Decision 8886-A (PECB, 2007).
ANALYSIS
The employer’s workforce consists of
approximately 13,000 employees in over 70 bargaining units. Among its services, the employer provides
public passenger transportation through its transit division. The union serves as the exclusive bargaining
representative of approximately 3,600 employees working in the transit
division. The bargaining unit employees
work in five major job classifications, including transit operator, vehicle
maintenance, facilities, supervision, and special classification. In 2008, the
parties completed negotiations for a successor collective bargaining agreement
effective from November 1, 2007, to October 31, 2010.
Budget Development for 2009
As the employer developed its 2009
budget, the financial landscape at the local, state, national, and
international level changed at a rapid pace.
The volatile economic environment created a variety of budgeting
challenges, including increasing the employer’s costs and decreasing its
revenues. Both the employer’s general
fund and transit funds faced significant deficits. Beth Goldberg, the employer’s Deputy Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, testified about the economic volatility
as follows:
So we continued to develop the budget, we continued to
monitor economic indicators. It was --
things were changing daily, hourly in terms of economic indicators. The stock market was rising, the stock market
was falling. Fuel prices were continuing
on its record-setting pace, but with fluctuations. By early September on the general fund side
the deficit had grown to $93.4 million.
Transit was looking at a $83 million deficit. And those were the parameters around which we
completed the 2009 proposed budget, in terms of closing a $93 million deficit
on the general fund side and an $83 million deficit for transit.
Some of the greatest budgeting
challenges for the employer, particularly in the transit fund, included the
declining sales tax revenue,(fn:1)
the increasing costs for diesel fuel,(fn:2)
and the increasing estimates for the cost of living adjustment (COLA).(fn:3)
_________________________________
fn:1 Sales tax revenues represent approximately 60 percent of transit’s total revenue.
fn:2 On an
annualized basis, every ten cent increase in diesel fuel prices costs the
employer an additional one million dollars. The employer had budgeted diesel fuel costs for 2008 at $2.60 per
gallon; the actual cost peaked at $4.27 per gallon.
fn:3 Many of the collective bargaining agreements between the employer and the labor organizations representing its employees provide for annual salary increases based upon the COLA.
In addition to the fiscal pressures,
the employer faced time pressures as it worked to balance the budget within its
budget adoption timeline. The employer’s
governing body, the King County Council (council), adopts a balanced budget for
each of its funds by late November.
Traditionally, the employer’s executive submits a proposed budget to
council in mid-October, giving the council time to review and consider the
proposed budget prior to the November adoption.
In October 2008, the transit division
submitted its mid-biennial supplemental budget request to Ron Sims, who was
then serving as the King County Executive.(fn:4) To close the $83 million gap for the
biennium, the transit division explored various options and proposed nine
specific changes, including increasing fares charged to consumers and spending
down its operating reserves. For transit
to use the operating reserves at the level proposed would have required the
council to change policies. The council
chose not to pursue some of the options, including spending the reserves down
as far as proposed.
______________________________
fn:4 In
2007, transit began biennial budgeting and developed a budget for 2008-2009.
Sims transmitted the employer’s
proposed budget to council on October 13.
The proposed budget eliminated hundreds of positions and discontinued
and reduced a variety of services. The
proposed budget also reduced compensation for unrepresented employees,
including reducing the COLA to three percent and eliminating merit
increases. Sims set aside a target
number for represented employees’ labor cost reductions, explaining he was
“relying on the same methodology used to determine the target savings for non-represented
employees. This will generate $8 million
in General Fund savings and $7.2 million in savings to other county funds in
2009.”
Negotiations with King County
Coalition of Labor Unions
The King County Coalition of Labor
Unions (the coalition) serves as an ad hoc group of labor organizations
representing a variety, but not all, of the bargaining units within the
employer’s operations. By letter to the
coalition co-chairs dated October 3, 2008, Sims sought the coalition’s
assistance in achieving a balanced budget for 2009. He identified the employer’s COLA formula as
“one of the most challenging aspects of this financial situation,” and said:
We have had positive preliminary discussions with you
about possible changes to both wages and benefits but we have not had time to
reach any final agreements. I needed to
make some final assumptions to balance the budget. Therefore, I have directed the budget office
to find the final $15 million in reductions from the wages of both represented
and non-represented employees.
Sims explained the labor cost
reduction approach with unrepresented employees and noted that the collective
bargaining agreements do not allow him to do the same with represented
employees. He stated:
However, I will be taking whatever steps I can under
the contracts to reduce costs. Given the
fiscal emergency, I am prepared to take the extraordinary step of requiring
staggered mandatory unpaid week long furloughs of all represented King County
employees in 2009 except for Corrections personnel and Sheriff’s Deputies. . .
. Furloughs in Transit provide little savings and would require reduction in
bus service so I will instead be seeking alternative reduction strategies with
Transit Employees.
Sims’ letter asked the coalition
co-chairs to partner with him on the furloughs or to bargain alternative ways
to generate the savings. He
stated that if they could not agree on solutions to reach the necessary
savings, layoffs would be necessary as well as looking at the benefit and wage
terms of open labor agreements.
His letter notes: “I am looking
forward to our meeting on October 6 where we can discuss both the furloughs and
any alternatives.” The parties
introduced no evidence from a meeting on October 6, 2008.
On October 13, 2008, the employer
announced to the coalition that it would shut down all but essential services
on 10 days in 2009 and place the employees on unpaid furlough for the 10 days. The employer offered to negotiate the impacts
of its decision with the coalition and the coalition agreed. Negotiations began October 14, 2008, and
involved over one dozen labor organizations, some representing multiple
bargaining units.
On October 27, 2008, after four to
five bargaining sessions, the coalition and the employer reached a tentative
agreement on the effects of the furlough days.
In an email to all employees, Sims announced the tentative agreement and
the 10 furlough days, explaining the “ten specific unpaid days are equal to a
3.85 percent reduction in pay.” He
stated:
If you are a union member, you will be hearing full
details from your union representatives and their recommendations. . . . While
this plan has the advantage of preserving the cumulative effect of COLA
increases, the ten days unpaid furlough would lower the net 2009 COLA increase
to one percent.
After specifying the dates of the
proposed furloughs, Sims explained, “If approved, this approach also allows us
to achieve additional savings on heating and cooling costs by shutting down
entire facilities on furlough days.”
According to Goldberg, the furlough
approach had the benefit of being an equitable, quick method within its
authority to reach the savings necessary to balance the budget while also
saving jobs. The employer calculated the
furloughs as saving the general fund $8.5 million and the non-general fund
$14.3 million. The employer calculated
the savings in the transit division at $1.7 million. This figure includes bargaining unit
employees represented by Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 587 (ATU),
non-represented employees, and employees in other bargaining units.
Negotiations with ATU
The union did not participate in the
bargaining between the employer and the coalition concerning the effects of the
furlough decision. Lance Norton, union
president and business representative, had not attended a coalition meeting in
seven years and did not know the bargaining concerning furloughs was taking
place. No one from the employer contacted the union about the furloughs or the
coalition bargaining until after the employer reached the coalition
agreement.
On or about October 27, 2008, David
Levin, the employer’s labor negotiator who was assigned to negotiate the
furlough effects with the union, informed Norton of the furlough decision and
the tentative agreement with the coalition.
The employer’s decision directly impacts 65 employees in the union’s
bargaining unit. Most of the furloughed
bargaining unit employees work in transit’s special classification and include
those in customer assistance, rider information, and pass sales. Six of the impacted bargaining unit employees
work in the finance and business operations division.
The union demanded to bargain the
furlough decision as well as the effects.
The employer offered to bargain only the effects. When the parties met on November 5, 2008, to
bargain the effects of the decision, the employer presented the coalition
agreement as its proposal. The union
shared several ideas on other cuts the employer could make as well as ideas to
lessen the financial impact on the employees.
The employer expressed an unwillingness to agree to anything that would
not assist in achieving the targeted labor cost savings. The employer rejected the union’s ideas
except for the possibility of allowing furloughed employees to use donated
compensatory time (AC time). After the
November 5 meeting, the employer further explored the union’s AC time idea and
informed the union that it was willing to pursue it if the union administered
the distribution of the donated funds.
The union then dropped the idea.
On November 19, 2008, Norton
presented the employer’s proposal to the impacted bargaining unit employees and
they rejected it. The union submitted no
written counter-proposals and requested no additional bargaining meetings with
the employer as it believed that the employer would agree to nothing outside
the coalition agreement.
By letter to the union dated December
8, 2008, the employer acknowledged that the parties had not reached agreement
on the effects of the furloughs and that the union had advised that it was not
interested in further effects bargaining.
The employer explained:
We are disappointed that we were unable to reach
agreement on effects before we begin the implementation process, as we had been
willing to offer certain protections to affected employees and to the
bargaining unit for your support. The
deadline of our proposal has now passed thus we are no longer offering the
terms that we discussed previously. For
example, we will no longer offer this bargaining unit furlough replacement
time. However, we will meet to resume
discussions about effects of the shut-down upon request.
The union requested no further effects bargaining and the employer implemented the furloughs beginning on January 2, 2009.(fn:5) The parties presented no evidence that they considered or requested mediation and, if necessary, interest arbitration.
_____________
(fn:5) Some of the bargaining unit employees
worked on January 2, 2009, the first furlough day. The employer decided to open the pass sales
office because the sale of passes generates revenue. The office has its own entrance which allowed
the rest of the King Street Center to remain closed. Other than the pass sales office on January
2, all but essential services cease operations on furlough days.
EMPLOYER’S
DECISION – MANDATORY SUBJECT
Applying the balancing test in this
case, I find that the extent to which the employer’s action impacts employee
wages, hours and working conditions predominates over the extent to which the
action is an essential management prerogative.
As a result, I conclude that the employer’s decision to furlough
employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The furloughs significantly impact
bargaining unit employees. The employer requires
employees to take unpaid leave on what would otherwise be 10 work days. This action reduces the employee work year by
80 hours and reduces employee compensation for 2009 by 3.85 percent. Employees who had scheduled vacation on work
days that became furlough days are required to change the time off to unpaid
time, thereby impacting the use of vacation, a working condition.
The employer makes several arguments
in support of its position that its action was an essential management
prerogative. The employer argues it is
critical that it be allowed to exercise its managerial prerogative to reduce
its budget and to determine the quantity and scope of its services, including
reducing the level of services it offers to the public. The employer asserts that it exercised such
prerogatives when it closed buildings and operations for 10 days and that
furloughing employees was an effect of that decision.
Furthermore, the employer states that
if its furlough decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining, it would be left
“without a way to address its budgetary issues” and expresses that such a
result “could place a union, or eventually PERC, in the position of requiring a
governmental entity to maintain services that it no longer wanted to provide or
that it could no longer afford.” The
employer also argues that had it been required to bargain and the parties could
not reach agreement, the employer “would have had little other choice but to
cut other programs. Where the County is
choosing between rider information and maintaining bus service levels, as it
was here, the decision is intrinsically managerial.”
The employer correctly states that it
has the right to determine its budget and budget priorities. The employer also has the right to determine
which services it wishes to offer and at what levels. This case, however, is not about an
employer’s decision to eliminate a service or to eliminate a product. This case is not about eliminating or
reducing a program or otherwise changing the scope of the employer’s
enterprise. Instead, this case is about
an employer’s decision to reduce its labor costs. Regardless of how the employer chooses to
characterize it, the fundamental nature of the employer’s action is a reduction
in labor costs achieved by cutting employee work days.
Sims’ written communication clearly
and explicitly identifies the employer’s reasons for its decision to close
operations for ten days and furlough employees.
His October 3 letter to the coalition co-chairs describes the employer’s
concern about the COLA and its need to reduce such labor costs. Sims’ October 13 budget submission to the
council identified targeted savings from represented employee costs, including
$8 million in general fund savings and $7.2 million in other fund savings. Sims’ October 27 email announcing the
coalition agreement focused on the COLA but noted that the furlough approach
“also allows us to achieve additional savings on heating and cooling costs by
shutting down entire facilities on furlough days.”
The employer presented no evidence
that non-labor cost savings from closing operations played an important role in
its decision. The employer presented no
evidence that it ever calculated such non-labor cost savings. The only reason the employer decided to close
buildings and operations on 10 days was to achieve its targeted savings from
labor costs.
Clearly, the employer faced serious
challenges in developing a balanced budget for 2009; it had to make significant
and difficult cuts. The employer
recognized that closing buildings and furloughing employees impacted the public
as well as employees. Looking at the
decision’s impact on the public and the employer’s need to consider the
political, social, and other such factors does not, however, tip the balance
toward the employer’s decision being a managerial prerogative.
My decision in this case does not
prevent the employer from taking responsible actions reflective of its
financial circumstances. Nor will this
decision require an employer to maintain services that it no longer wishes to
provide, as the employer fears. This
decision simply requires that the employer fulfill its bargaining obligation as
it considers taking actions that change mandatory terms and conditions of
employment. As the Commission explained
in City of Tukwila, Decision 9691-A
(PECB, 2008), a case where the employer argued it was excused from bargaining
with the union about health insurance benefits because it needed to offer only
one schedule of benefits for all groups of employees:
Although the employer may fear that result [that
bargaining about benefits would result in a second schedule of benefits], that
fear alone does not alleviate it from its collective bargaining obligation, and
also fails to recognize that while Chapter 41.56 RCW requires the employer to
negotiate in good faith with the union regarding mandatory subjects, it does
not compel agreement. RCW
41.56.030(4).
Skagit County,
Decision 8746-A (PECB, 2006), a case involving ferry service, is also
instructive. In that case the Commission
concluded that although the employer had the right to determine the level of
ferry service and to set the sailing schedule, it did not have the right to
change the employees’ shift schedule to fit the new sailing schedule without bargaining. The Commission rejected the employer’s
expansive interpretation of management prerogatives as encompassing scheduling
employees to fit the employer’s new level of service and explained:
As was noted in City
of Auburn, Decision 901 (PECB, 1980), if limitations on management
flexibility were the criteria for determining whether union proposals on work
hours were a mandatory subject of bargaining, most proposals, as such, would be
subject to challenge, and RCW 41.56.030(4) would be rendered meaningless. Thus, the shifts worked by employees are
generally accepted as a mandatory subject of bargaining, and an employer that
desires to change employee work shifts is obligated to bargain that change with
the union representing its employees.
An important premise underlying the
collective bargaining laws is that collective discussions between management
and labor will result in better decisions.
City of Centralia, Decision
5282-A (PECB, 1996). How an employer
reduces labor costs is a type of decision that can be improved through
collective bargaining. In City of Centralia, Decision 5282-A, a
case involving the issue of staffing levels, the Commission, quoting from First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 452
US 666 (1981), stated:
In the process of deciding that case [First National Maintenance v NLRB],
however, the Court considered that an employer’s desire to reduce labor costs
alone is a matter ‘peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective
bargaining framework’. First National Maintenance Corporation v.
NLRB, at 679-680. Here, the employer
was not attempting to decrease its service or change the scope of the
enterprise; the employer has pointed to no other reasons for its actions but to
reduce labor costs. Under First National Maintenance, the issue is
clearly suitable for collective bargaining.
(footnote omitted)
Conclusion
The employer’s decision to furlough
employees on 10 days in 2009 was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The employer’s decision reduces employee work
days, reduces employee compensation, and alters working conditions. By unilaterally imposing such changes, the
employer interfered with employee rights and refused to bargain in violation of
RCW 41.56.140(4) and (1).
BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE
The employer raises the affirmative
defense of business necessity. To
establish this defense, the employer must demonstrate that a business necessity
existed, that it provided adequate notice to the union of the proposed change, and
that the parties bargained over the effects of the change or the union waived
bargaining.
The employer’s witnesses concerning
the budget, Goldberg and Jill Krecklow, the transit division’s finance and
administrative services manager, testified credibly and convincingly about the
status of the employer’s 2008 budget and their work in developing the 2009
budget.(fn:6) The employer established that it faced
serious challenges in developing a balanced budget for 2009. The volatile economic environment required
the employer to make significant cuts to develop a balanced budget and time was
limited. Despite their credible
testimony, the employer failed to establish that a business necessity
existed.
______________________
fn:6 I
base this decision on the information the employer had at the time it made its
budgeting and furlough decisions. As a
result, I do not consider the employer’s subsequent receipt of stimulus funds,
audit information concerning the transit reserve funds, or the testimony of the
union’s economist.
In two relatively recent decisions,
the Commission found that the employers established that a business necessity
existed. In Cowlitz County, Decision 7007-A, the Commission concluded that the
employer established its business necessity defense and that the employer did
not commit an unfair labor practice when it changed the employees’ health
insurance plan without bargaining. In
that case, the employer attempted to reach the union attorney by phone to
discuss the impending termination of the employees’ health insurance plan due
to the union’s change in representation. When the attorney failed to return the
employer’s telephone calls, the employer sent a letter to the union attorney
and union president explaining the issue and offering an alternate health
insurance plan. In the letter, the
employer clarified that it was not asking the union to waive its right to
bargain health insurance when negotiating the contract. The union attorney failed to respond. In that case, the employer tried to engage
the union in discussion of the problem but the union was unresponsive. Had the employer done nothing, the employees
would have been left without health insurance.
In Skagit County, Decision 8886-A, the Commission agreed with the
employer that it was excused from bargaining the decision to deduct industrial
insurance premiums from employees’ pay because the employer had a statutory
obligation to make the deductions.
In this case, no law required the
employer to furlough employees. The
employer was not required to take a certain action to avoid a lapse in some
important benefit. Although the evidence
in this case demonstrates that the employer had limited time to develop a
balanced budget, the record does not demonstrate that the only way it could
achieve a balanced budget was to unilaterally impose furloughs. Although the employer faced difficult choices
in cutting the budget, it did have options.
Furthermore, the record reveals nothing to suggest that there were any
obstacles to bargaining with the union.
The employer presented no evidence that the union was unresponsive to
the employer or that any union action or issues impeded the possibility of
bargaining.
Even if the employer had established
a business necessity existed, the employer failed to provide the union with
timely notice of its proposed furloughs.
By letter to the coalition co-chairs dated October 3, 2008, Sims stated
“I am looking to you as labor leaders to partner with me on this [furloughs] or
to bargain alternative ways to generate these savings. I am willing to consider any combination of
wages and benefit reductions that achieve the $10 million in 2009 with or
without the furloughs.”
This highlights that 24 days before
informing the union of its furlough decision and inviting the union to engage
in effects bargaining, the employer invited the coalition to bargain furloughs
or alternate ways to achieve the savings.
The record offers no explanation of why the employer provided notice of
the potential furloughs to other labor organizations 24 days prior to the
employer providing notice to the union. The
record also offers no explanation of why the employer offered other labor
organizations the opportunity to negotiate the furlough decision when it only
offered the union the opportunity to negotiate the effects of the
decision. In this particular situation
where time for action is already limited, a 24 day delay is not timely.
Finally, as described below, the
employer failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to engage in effects
bargaining.
Conclusion
The employer failed to establish a
business necessity defense excusing it from its bargaining obligations.
EFFECTS BARGAINING
The parties make various arguments in
support of their positions on effects bargaining. I find it unnecessary to address their
arguments. The parties do not dispute
that they failed to reach agreement on the effects of the furloughs and that
the employer implemented the furloughs beginning on January 2, 2009. The employer offered to re-open bargaining on
the effects of the furloughs at any time.
The union chose to file the present unfair labor practice complaint
rather than pursue additional bargaining.
It is undisputed that neither party sought mediation or interest
arbitration.
As stated above under “Applicable
Legal Standards,” when a transit employer and union are unable to agree to a proposed
change to wages, hours or working conditions, the employer may not unilaterally
implement the change. City of Tukwila, Decision 9691-A. RCW 41.56.492 gives the parties the
opportunity to request mediation to resolve the issues in disagreement and, if
not resolved in mediation, to submit the issues in disagreement to interest
arbitration.
Conclusion
The employer failed to satisfy its
obligation to negotiate the effects of the furlough decision. The employer’s unilateral implementation of
the furloughs without having reached agreement with the union or pursuing the
process outlined in RCW 41.56.492 constitutes an unfair labor practice.
CONCLUSION
The employer’s decision to furlough
bargaining unit employees on 10 days in 2009 was a mandatory subject of
bargaining. The employer failed to
establish its business necessity defense and, therefore, committed an unfair
labor practice when it refused to bargain its decision to furlough bargaining
unit employees. The employer also
committed an unfair labor practice when it failed to satisfy its obligation to
negotiate the effects of the furlough decision by implementing its decision
without having reached agreement with the union or pursuing the process
outlined in RCW 41.56.492.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
King
County (employer) is a public employer within the meaning of RCW
41.56.030(1). The employer operates and
maintains a public passenger transportation system through its transit
division.
2.
Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 587 (union), is a bargaining representative within the
meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3) and serves as the exclusive bargaining
representative of King County employees working in the transit division.
3.
During
all relevant times, the union and the employer were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement.
4.
During
all relevant times, Ron Sims served as the King County Executive.
5.
The
King County Coalition of Labor Unions (coalition) serves as an ad hoc group of
labor organizations representing a variety of, but not all, the bargaining
units within the employer’s operations.
6.
The
volatile economic environment created a variety of budgeting challenges for the
employer, including increasing costs and decreasing revenue. Both the employer’s general fund and transit
fund faced significant deficits as the employer developed its 2009 budget.
7.
In
addition to the fiscal pressures, the employer faced time pressures as it
worked to balance the budget within its budget adoption timeline.
8.
By
letter to the coalition co-chairs dated October 3, 2008, Ron Sims identified
the employer’s COLA formula as one of the most challenging aspects of the
employer’s financial situation and invited the coalition to bargain the
furloughs or alternate ways to achieve labor cost savings.
9.
On
October 13, 2008, the employer announced to the coalition that it would shut
down all but essential services on 10 days in 2009 and place the employees on
unpaid furlough for the 10 days.
10.
On
October 27, 2008, after four to five bargaining sessions, the coalition and the
employer reached a tentative agreement on the effects of the furlough
days.
11.
The
union did not participate in the bargaining between the employer and the
coalition concerning the effects of the furlough decision. No one from the employer contacted the union
about the furloughs or the coalition bargaining until after the employer and
coalition reached the tentative agreement.
12.
On
or about October 27, 2008, the employer informed the union of the furlough
decision and the tentative agreement with the coalition.
13.
The
furloughs directly impact 65 of the union’s bargaining unit employees.
14.
The
union demanded to bargain the furlough decision as well as the effects. The employer offered to bargain only the
effects, refusing to bargain the decision.
15.
When
the employer and the union were unable to reach agreement on the effects of the
furloughs, neither the union nor the employer requested mediation or interest
arbitration. The employer offered to
resume effects bargaining upon the union’s request.
16.
The
employer began implementation of the furloughs on January 2, 2009.
17.
The
furloughs directly affect bargaining unit employees’ wages, hours and working
conditions. The furloughs require
employees to take unpaid leave on what would otherwise be 10 work days. This reduces the employee work year by 80
hours and reduces employee compensation for 2009 by 3.85 percent. Employees who had scheduled vacation on work
days that became furlough days are required to change the time off to unpaid
time.
18.
The
reason the employer decided to close operations on 10 days was to reach its
targeted savings from labor costs. The
fundamental nature of the employer’s action was a reduction in labor costs
achieved by cutting employee work days.
19.
The
extent to which the employer’s action impacts employee wages, hours and working
conditions predominates over the extent to which the action is an essential
management prerogative.
20.
The
employer did not prove that a business necessity existed as it presented no
evidence that unilaterally imposing furloughs was required or that it was the
only way it could achieve a balanced budget.
21.
No
union action or issues impeded the possibility of bargaining the furlough
decision with the union.
22.
The
employer failed to provide the union with timely notice of its proposed
furloughs, having provided the coalition with notice 24 days earlier.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
The
Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction in this matter under
Chapter 41.56 RCW and 391-45 WAC.
2.
The
changes described in Findings of Fact 12, 16, and 17 are a mandatory subject of
bargaining which the employer must bargain under RCW 41.56.140(4).
3.
The
employer did not establish a business necessity defense excusing it from its
bargaining obligations under Chapter 41.56 RCW.
4.
By
its actions described in Findings of Fact 14, 15, and 16, the employer refused
to bargain and interfered with employee rights in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4)
and (1).
ORDER
1. CEASE AND DESIST from:
a. Unilaterally reducing the number of
employee work days and, as a result, reducing compensation by furloughing
bargaining unit employees.
b. Refusing to bargain the decision and the effects of
the decision to reduce the number of employee work days and, as a result,
reducing compensation, by furloughing bargaining unit employees.
c. Acting in any other manner that interferes
with, restrains, or coerces its employees in the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights under the laws of the state of Washington.
2. TAKE THE FOLLOWING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the purposes and policies of Chapter
a.
Restore
the status quo ante by reinstating the wages, hours and working conditions
which existed for the employees in the affected bargaining unit prior to the
unilaterally imposed 10 furlough days found unlawful in this order.
b.
Give
notice to and, upon request, negotiate in good faith with Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 587, before
c.
Post
copies of the notice provided by the Compliance Officer of the Public
Employment Relations Commission in conspicuous places on the employer’s
premises where notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted. These notices shall be duly signed by an
authorized representative of the respondent, and shall remain posted for 60
consecutive days from the date of initial posting. The respondent shall take reasonable steps to
ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other
material.
d.
Read
the notice provided by the Compliance Officer into the record at a regular public
meeting of the
e.
Notify
the complainant, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order,
as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same
time provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice attached to this
order.
f.
Notify
the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment Relations Commission, in writing,
within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been
taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the Compliance
Officer with a signed copy of the notice attached to this order.
ISSUED at Olympia, Washington,
this
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
This order will be the final
order of the
agency unless a notice of appeal
is filed
with the Commission under WAC
391-45-350.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
NOTICE
THE
WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION CONDUCTED A LEGAL PROCEEDING
IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT. THE COMMISSION RULED THAT
WE
UNLAWFULLY unilaterally furloughed 65 bargaining unit employees, reducing 10 of
their work days and reducing their wages by 3.85 percent.
WE
UNLAWFULLY refused to bargain with the union about our decision and the effects
of our decision to furlough the employees, which interfered with the rights of
our employees.
TO REMEDY OUR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES:
WE
WILL reinstate the wages, hours and working conditions which existed for the bargaining
unit employees prior to our unilateral actions found unlawful in this Order.
WE
WILL notify the union and, upon request, bargain with the union, any future
decision and the effects of such decision to reduce the number of work
days.
WE
WILL NOT, in any other manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights under the laws of
the State of Washington.
DO NOT POST OR PUBLICLY READ THIS NOTICE.
AN OFFICIAL NOTICE FOR POSTING AND READING
WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE COMPLIANCE OFFICER.